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BOOK REVIEW
THE EFFICACY OF ORGANIC TORT REFORM
James A. Henderson,Jr.t
Depending on how one defines the term "crisis,"' the United
States experienced a products liability insurance crisis in 1985 and
1986. Premiums surged dramatically after five years of remaining
essentially flat, and business firms complained of not being able to
obtain, or afford, adequate coverage. In his book, Reforming Products
Liability,2 W. Kip Viscusi (hereinafter "the author") examines the
underlying causes of this crisis; concludes that they include, in significant measure, wrong-headed liability rules; and proposes
changes in those rules, together with other institutional adjustments, to correct the deficiencies. 3 Building on a fairly prodigious
amount of published work over the last decade, 4 the author combines two distinctive perspectives: economic analysis and empirical
investigation. These perspectives are clearly his comparative advantages, and he exploits them successfully. The author stumbles a bit
in connection with the legal analysis. Lawyers, especially products
liability mavens, will realize at several junctures that the author is
neither a lawyer nor a products specialist.5 However, with only a
Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
See generally, Stephen Daniels, The Question ofJury Competence and the Politicsof Civil
Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 269,
275-77 (1989) (labeling a social, political, or economic phenomenon a "crisis" is a political process, subject to self-conscious manipulation).
t

1

2

W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODuc-rs LIABIIry (1991).

3 One might argue that I have taken the author too seriously when I characterize
him as "proposing changes." Thus, in his Preface he asserts: "This book is not an effort
to advocate a specific and immediate legislative agenda. Rather, its main purpose is to
provide guiding principles .... Id. at xii. In his first chapter, however, he titles his plan
"Proposals for Reform." Id. at 11.
4
In his bibliography, the author lists 32 books and articles published in the last
ten years. Id. at 257-66.
5
Virtually every serious legal commentator finds it important to distinguish between design and warning defects. And yet, the author refers to "the emergence of a
new design defect: the inadequate hazard warning." Id. at 9. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), involved a manufacturing defect, not defective design.
The author, though, refers to "the emergence of the design defect doctrine in the 1960
Henningsen decision." Viscusi, supra note 2, at 28. Finally, in Swartz v. General Motors
Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 1978), the court said that warranty liability in Massachusetts is "as comprehensive as that provided by [the strict liability in tort provision in]
§ 402A of the Restatement." And yet, the author says that "the principle of strict liability has not been adopted [in] .. .Massachusetts." Viscusi, supra note 2, at 45.
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few exceptions, these shortcomings do not detract from understand-

ing. And the confusing substantive legal aspects can be straightened out at acceptable cost. Let me make clear that I think this is a
good book, well worth the time it takes to read and react to it. Un-

like some criticisms of products liability developments in recent
years, it does not yell at the top of its voice.6 It is balanced and
sensitive to institutional limitations. 7 For these reasons it should attract considerable attention.

Starting from the premise that the objective of any system of
safety regulation should be "to strike an appropriate balance between safety and the costs incurred to achieve this safety," 8 the author provides an integrated, internally consistent package for
"designing social risk policy." 9 In some respects, especially in connection with liability rules, his proposals would cut back product
distributors' exposure under existing law. In other respects, espedally in measuring damages awards, his plan would increase exposures. The author approaches each of these subjects independently,
making no effort to argue that the reductions on one side would
balance increases on the other. Thus, unlike some proposals for reform which appear to be directed at reducing business firms' liability
costs, 10 the author's proposals have an engaging "chips fall where
they may" freshness. For these reasons and for reasons I develop
subsequently, I describe the offered reform proposals as
"organic."'
Before moving to a critique of the substantive proposals for
change, let us consider the empirical dimensions of the author's
work. His tasks in this regard are threefold. First, he must plausibly
argue that our liability system faces a crisis that, at least in significant
measure, exists independently of the peculiar characteristics of the
insurance industry. Second, he must connect the crisis to specific
aspects of the legal doctrines and procedures that determine firms'
exposures to liability. Finally, he must plausibly show that the
changes he proposes will work to reduce the problems he has
identified.
6

Cf PETER HUBER, LIABILITy: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

(1988).
7 Viscusi, supra note 2,at 6: "If our objective is to establish an appropriate risk
policy rather than simply to consider modifications in products liability, then part of our
job is to recommend an appropriate institutional division of labor."
8 Id.at2.
9 Id.at5.
10 Id at 4 ("The apparent objective of most tort reform efforts is simple: costs must
be reduced."). See also Viscusi, supra note 2,at 211.
I I Webster's New World Dictionary defines "organic" as "systematically arranged."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 302 (1989).
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Regarding the first of these tasks-making a plausible case that
a crisis exists-the author advances two major arguments: (1) he
examines recent trends in the pricing and availability of liability insurance, showing that insurance markets have failed in recent years
in ways that are plausibly linked to failures in the liability system;
and (2) he examines recent trends in liability, showing that they
have deviated significantly from what a properly designed and
healthy liability system would have generated.
On the first front, the author looks at a number of insurance
indicators over the past several decades, tracking trends in aggregate premiums paid, ratios of losses paid out to premiums taken in,
and aggregate coverages. 2 The critical period for his analysis is
1980-1984: GNP rose dramatically, suggesting growing demand for
insurance, i s and liability insurance prices remained constant, suggesting that one could have expected a significant increase in the
amount of insurance coverage (measured by aggregate premiums).
The decline of aggregate coverage during this same period suggests
market failure-insurance companies were getting out of the business of writing products liability insurance for reasons that find their
source in the liability system.' 4 If the relevant data had shown
steeply rising prices or increasing coverage over the relevant period,
they would have begged the question of whether or not a crisis existed.1 5 But the counter-intuitive shrinkages in coverage caused by
withdrawals of insurers and insureds from markets that should have
been expanding suggest, to the author, that the tort system was not
6
working as it should.'
Examining the liability system over recent years, the author
paints a picture of surging levels of litigation and rising levels of
damages awards.' 7 At one point he notes that asbestos claims account for much of the surge in recent years,' 8 and he refers to the
comparative stability of nonasbestos cases.' 9 Yet while he observes
that asbestos accounts for much of the increases, he concludes his
description of litigation trends by observing that "other products
liability litigation has risen as well."' 20 The clear implication is that
Viscusi, supra note 2, at 30-34.
13 Holding all else constant, these variables normally have a strong positive correlation. Id. at 34.
14 Id. at 35-37.
15 During a growth surge in GNP, rising insurance prices and increasing aggregate
coverage would have been consistent with a normally functioning liability system and a
healthy insurance market.
16 Viscusi, supra note 2, at 36-37.
12

17
18
19
20

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 16.
at 41.
at 22.
at41.
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rapidly rising and largely unpredictable trends in litigation are an
important part of what is causing insurance markets to fail.
When the author links existing doctrine with the real world, he
shifts from an empirical to a normative mode. That is, he examines
design liability, damages, liability for failure to warn, toxic torts and
worker compensation. He then makes, essentially normative judgments regarding which approaches make sense in light of his assumptions regarding efficiency-based objectives. I do not fault him
for making this shift, because I do not know how else he could have
proceeded. Though he sprinkles these chapters with empirical observations, the judgments he reaches regarding how to proceed with
reform are normative.
Before assessing the author's proposals for change, let me react
to his more straightforward empirical analysis of trends in the insurance and litigation systems. Regarding his empirical description of
the insurance component of the crisis, I am not sure what to think.
George Priest has advanced an explanation for the flight of insurers
and insureds from commercial insurance markets that has less to do
with uncertainty and escalating liability than with the shift from firstparty to third-party insurance. 2' In effect, Priest advises us to eliminate the "insure against residual losses" element that he claims has
crept into current thinking about products liability, and stick to deterrence. As we shall see momentarily, that advice is similar to
Viscusi's. Moreover, some observers have attributed the recent insurance crisis to business cycles in the insurance industry. 2 2 Given
these conflicts among informed observers of the liability insurance
scene, I shall defer discussion of what insurance trends tell us until
someone comes up with more hard facts and a more complete
model with which to explain what has been happening.
As for the author's picture of liability trends, I have several
more pointed criticisms. First, it is unhelpful to conflate, as does the
author, asbestos and nonasbestos claims when talking about such
recent trends in products liability as filings, trials, and outcomes.
Asbestos claims so overwhelm the rest as to render analysis of the
"other" meaningless.2 3 The author appears to sympathize with this
conclusion, 24 but then misstates the nonasbestos experience. The
best sources on filings and litigation trends, as the author appears to
agree,2 5 are the federal district court data gathered by the Adminis21
See George Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 437 (1987).
22 See Scott Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability InsuranceMarket, in LIABILrY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 77 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988).
23
1988 ANNUAL REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 184 (Table C-2A).
24 Viscusi, supra note 2, at 20-22, 41.
25 Id. at 16.
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trative Office of the United States District Courts. 2 6 Contrary to the
author's view, nonasbestos products filings in federal courts have
been in a dramatic, unrelenting decline from 1985 through 1990.27
This decline, coupled with concomitant declines in plaintiffs' success rates and other indicators over the same period, suggests an
easing of whatever liability crisis may have been building over the
years prior to 1985.28 My point here is not that products liability
reform is no longer needed. The post-1985 declines to which I refer may still leave the system in need of repair. Moreover, normative reasons, to which we will now turn attention, may justify
changing the existing system. My narrower point is that some aspects of the author's depiction of our current situation, which he
uses to show a need for change, are misleading.
Turning to the author's proposals for change, or at least to
what the author refers to as "guiding principles," 2 9 I will first describe them and then assess their merits. On the legal standards for
liability, he proposes that courts continue to impose strict liability
for manufacturing defects because commercial distributors can perform an insurance function in that context.3 0 His major concerns
focus on the rules determining liability for failure to warn, liability
for defective designs, and the measure of compensatory recovery
when death or injury to health are involved. Regarding liability for
failure to warn, the author would tighten courts' analyses in ways
3
that closely track suggestions in an article I recently co-authored, '
an article he cites elsewhere with approval.3 2 Courts should apply a
risk-utility test in determining when warnings should be given.
Warnings should be required only when they convey new information in a convincing manner-that is, when the court has confidence
that a warning would have communicated helpful information that
the user needed. 33 The author also rejects imposing liability for failures to warn of risks that were unknowable at the time of original
distribution. In short, courts should understand the cost of warnings and should review warnings-based claims more rigorously.
26 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 518-22

(1990).
27
28

29
30

31
bility:
32

Id at 532-36. Recently published data for 1989 and 1990 show further declines.
See generally Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 26.
See supra note 3.
See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 209.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in Products LiaThe Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990).
A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 57

n.36 (1991).
33 See Viscusi, supra note 2 at 139-46.
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Two aspects of the author's proposal regarding failure to warn
depart from my own recently published analysis. First, he advocates
that compliance with regulatory provisions constitutes a complete
bar to liability; 34 my co-author and I considered and rejected this
conclusion in our earlier product warnings article.3 5 Second, the
author calls for a "national warnings policy" to establish a uniform
vocabulary for warnings. He appears to be calling for an extension
of FDA-like, standardized warnings for all products, not just
drugs.3 6 Only regulations that meet the FDA-like standards will bar
liability for firms complying with them. Thus, until such a national
warnings policy is established (or rather, to the extent that such a
policy has enjoyed only limited implementation at any point in
time), the author expects his "compliance is exculpatory" approach
37
to apply to relatively few product categories.
The author's proposals regarding liability for defective designs
are somewhat confusing. He begins by making clear that he favors a
risk-utility, essentially negligence-based approach. Strict liability,
with its insurance implications, should not be applied in the context
of liability for defective product designs.3 8 With that I can hardly
disagree.3 9 The author then divides the risk-utility test into three
separate components, to be applied independently and sequentially.
This is where I found the analysis a bit confusing. The first test
weighs three factors. 40 The second test adds a fourth factor to the
those weighed in applying the first test.41 And the third test adds
three more factors into the second test.4 2 Putting all three riskutility tests together in a sequence results in what the author refers
to as "a more tightly specified negligence standard" than that applied under existing risk-utility approaches to defective design. 43
On my initial reading it was not clear why each test was framed the
ViscUsi, supra note 2, at 128-29.
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 31, at 321. Essentially, we rejected the
compliance defense because we did not have adequate confidence in the standards to
which firms would presumably conform. The author purports to solve this problem by
mandating new, more adequate federal standards.
36 Viscusi, supra note 2, at 155.
37 Id. at 154.
38 Id. at 75-78.
39
See James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979).
40
The author labels the first test the "purchaser's risk-utility index." Viscusi, supra
note 2, at 78. This threshold asks whether "the expected benefits of the product exceed
the expected injury costs." Three factors are considered: the consumer's willingness to
pay for the product, the purchase cost, and the unexpected injury cost. Id.
41
The second "private risk-utility test" factors in the profits to the producer. Id.
42
The "social benefit-cost test" takes into account the "adverse effects on parties
other than the purchaser" and considers three additional factors: taxes, benefits to
other parties, and costs to other parties. Id.
34

35

43

Id. at 81.
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way it was4 4 nor whether and how courts (or other governmental
45
institutions) were to apply them.
Rather than rehearse in detail the sources of this confusion, I
will simply observe that a lawyer concerned with applying the author's proposals in court would need more guidance than that offered regarding which institutions are to apply which tests. At the
risk of appearing to generalize from a single instance, this is probably an example of a theoretically appropriate proposal playing
somewhat loose with the realities with which lawyers must deal.
This is puzzling, given the author's obvious concerns for process
46
and institutional competence.
In my view, the author's position on the tests for defective design and who should apply them is as follows: Three tests should be
used to determine whether a particular product design deserves to
be marketed. Both the first and the third tests would determine the
threshold question of whether any broad category of products, of
which the particular product in question is an example, deserves to
be marketed in the first instance. Courts are not competent to run
the risk-utility calculi necessary to apply these "whether to market at
all?" tests. Categorical decisions regarding marketability should be
the exclusive responsibility of nonjudicial agencies, who should exercise that responsibility relatively vigorously. The courts would
only apply the second test, and would apply it only in the context of
marginal review of particular product designs compared with feasi47
ble design alternatives.
I agree wholeheartedly that courts are not equipped to decide
whether broad categories of products are "good for America." 48
However, the way the author presents the issues, one could read
him as urging upon Congress and nonjudicial regulatory agencies a
more vigorous review, at the categorical level, of which classes of
products should or should not be marketed. If that is his intent,
then I must dissent. Even if Congress is institutionally capable of
conducting such review, as courts surely are not, I trust that Congress will see the folly in substituting its categorical judgments on
44
I was particularly puzzled about how a product could meet the first test (see supra
note 40) and yet fail to meet the second (see supra note 41). It seemed to me that the
question of profitability was one for the defendant to answer, not the court. I now understand that profitability (or rather, lack thereof) is an issue the defendant raises in
attacking the plaintiff's suggested alternative design. The book, however, does not
make this clear.
45
The book never sets forth the rules clearly and straightforwardly.
46
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47
Viscusi, supra note 2, at 84.
48
For an article making this very point, see James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron Twer-

ski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66

N.Y.U. L.

REV.

1263 (1991).

1992]

BOOK REVIEW-TORT REFORM

603

overall marketability with those reached by the market. Congress
and the agencies certainly may (and do) engage in marginal reviews
of how firms are designing and marketing products. 4 9 But macro
analysis regarding which broad categories of products deserve to be
marketed should, and surely will, be left almost entirely to the marketplace. That the author would suggest otherwise is undoubtedly
due, at least in part, to his treating all three risk-utility tests as legal
tests for defectiveness, which product designs must pass, and then
assigning two of these tests to nonjudicial governmental agencies.
By implying that the first and third tests are legal tests for defectiveness, he feels constrained to assign them to one governmental
agency or another. I would insist that categorical judgments regarding which broad classes of products deserve to be marketed in most
instances ought not be decided by any governmental agency, but
rather by the market.
Two more features of the author's proposal regarding liability
for defective designs remain. Consistent with his position on warnings, the author concludes that designs should not be found defective if they conform to applicable design safety standards
established by regulatory agencies. 50 Once again, conformance to
regulation is exculpatory. The last feature of the author's proposal
for regulating product designs relates to whether the relevant riskutility analyses are to be run on the basis of knowledge of risk at the
time the producer acted, or knowledge of risk at the time the regulatory decision was reached. The author adopts "time producer acts"
for the first and second tests, 5 ' but "time of regulatory decision" for
the third. 52 If my gloss of his institutional competence analysis is
correct, then "time of regulatory decision" is appropriate for the
third test because that test is to be applied not by courts retroactively, but prospectively, by nonjudicial regulators. 53 Of course,
that leaves the question of why the first test should not also be applied based on "time of regulatory decision" knowledge.
The last major element on the author's products reform agenda
is the appropriate measure of compensatory damages. He distinguishes between an "insurance" measure, which coincides with what
persons at risk of injury would be willing to buy in the way of coverage ex ante;54 and a "deterrence" measure, which coincides with
what it would take to achieve optimum producer deterrence, again
49

50
51
52
53
54

See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1988).
Viscusi, supra note 2,at 85.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 81.
See text preceding note 46,supra.
Viscusi, supra note 2, at 89.
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ex ante.5 5 Having argued that products liability should not try to
serve a social insurance function, the author concludes that the deterrence measure is in many cases an appropriate measure of compensatory damage awards. For deaths and adverse effects on health,
he observes that current law often seriously undervalues awards to
victims. 5 6 Indeed, he implies that in some cases, when the need for
deterrence is great, plaintiffs should recover approximately ten
times more in tort compensatory damages than they are currently
57
recovering.
So much for a description of the major elements of the author's
proposal for reforming products liability. Do they make sense? To
answer this question, several assessments are required. First, is the
guiding objective of allocative efficiency appropriate? Second, in
theory would his proposal achieve that objective? Third, if the elements of his proposal could somehow be implemented, would we
like what we ended up with? Fourth, how likely, as a practical matter, are the elements to be implemented? And finally, what are the
implications of gradual, or only partial, implementation?
I shall not try to answer questions one and two. Regarding the
first, a rich debate continues over whether and to what extent efficiency provides a legitimate, workable norm for guiding law makers. 58 Regarding the second, while an affirmative answer seems
appropriate, I lack the expertise in microeconomics to offer it with
complete confidence. For these reasons, and because I believe the
last three questions are more interesting, I will assume "yes" answers to questions one and two in order to address the others.
Before answering questions three, four and five, it will be helpful to review the major elements of the author's proposal and their
organic relationship. Let us begin by observing that three major institutions regulate product safety decisions in this country: the tort
liability system, other (nonjudicial) systems of safety regulation, and
the market. All three interact with each other; each one affects, and
55
56

Id. at 90.

58

See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Products

Id "If the courts wish to become a significant social institution for controlling
risks, then changing the damages calculation procedure is essential."
57 Id. at 214: "We are sending firms price signals that in effect enable them to pay
ten cents on the dollar for the economic value of the lives that will be lost as a result of
product risks." See also id at 211 ("If courts generally adopt novel damages concepts,
")
damages will increase by a factor of ten ..
such as the deterrence value of life....
The author's reform package of making it more difficult to find liability while allowing
significantly greater measures of recovery when liability is found is similar to a proposal
advanced recently byJason Johnston, albeit for different reasons. Jason Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385
(1987).
Liability, 14J.

LEGAL

NoMos 83 (1982).

STUD. 535 (1985);Jules L. Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, 24
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is affected by, the other two. Within the tort liability system it is
useful to distinguish between decisions affecting liability, on the one
hand, and damages, on the other. And within decisions affecting
liability, one may usefully distinguish in this context between decisions regarding product design -and decisions regarding product
marketing.
One may represent the foregoing institutional components of
product safety regulation diagrammatically as follows, with the arrows representing the interdependencies among the elements.

LIABILITY
TORT

NON-TORT

DESIGN
WARNING

DAMAGES

MARKETPLACE
FIGURE 1

Assuming that Figure 1 metaphorically represents the existing
system, Figure 2, on the next page, represents the author's proposed alternative liability system, with the changes in regulatory emphasis reflected in changes in size and boldness of the typeface.
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LIABILITY

DESIGN

TORT

4

*

NON-TORT

WANIGREGULATION

DAMAGES

MRKETPLACE
FIGURE

2

Figure 2 captures graphically the changes that the author's proposal, if implemented, would bring. Within the tort system, exposure to liability has diminished and damages have increased.
(Overall, Figure 2 shows "Tort" to have remained constant, but that
might or might not actually occur.) Moreover, reflecting these
changes, the linkage between liability and damages is for the first
time made explicit in Figure 2. Nontort regulation has increased
dramatically, and the linkage between tort and nontort is now primarily focused on design and warning. Finally, the role of the marketplace has been diminished, reflecting the intrusion of nontort
regulation into the processes of decisionmaking regarding which
categories of products may and may not be marketed at all.
Armed with the insights Figures 1 and 2 provide, we may now
address the remaining questions. Assuming that the author's proposal could be implemented, would Americans be pleased with the
results? Here I may be estopped, given my earlier assumptions that
efficiency is an appropriate goal and that the author's plan would
achieve that goal. But consider the realities to which we would have
to adjust. A new, product-oriented federal bureaucracy would have
been created that would dictate the level of safety that must be
achieved in connection with product design and marketing. Think
of the concentration of centralized, bureaucratized power this would
entail. From the regulatory standpoint, hairdryers and hand drills
might receive practically the same attention as prescription drugs.
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Moreover, far fewer tort plaintiffs would succeed in court;5 9 but
those that did succeed would be perceived as having hit the jackpot. 60 I plead guilty to bringing nonefficiency-based values into
these remarks, and I may be accused of changing the rules of my
critique in mid-play. Yet, it is one thing to accept the efficiency objective as an abstract ideal; it is quite another to face the practical
realities generated by logically relentless reliance on that ideal.
That brings us to the question of implementation. I begin with
the assumption that only federal legislation could accomplish the
changes the author advocates. Certainly the systems that regulate
the contents of warnings and decide "which product categories benefit purchasers?" would, by the author's own admission, require regulation at the federal level. 6 1 Moreover, the changes in the liability
rules to be applied by courts would require federal legislation in
62
order to achieve economy-wide efficiency.
How likely is it that Congress would promulgate and enact the
necessary statutes and regulations? I peg the probability at near
zero for the foreseeable future. 63 Even if promulgation and enactment were to occur, how likely is it that those actors to whom the
mandates were addressed-regulatory agencies and courts-would
comply fully enough to achieve the system's efficiency goals? I
would peg this probability at near zero for longer than the foreseeable future. Regarding the regulations aimed at categorical design
decisions, I would be just as happy if agencies failed to promulgate
regulations. 64 Regarding product warnings, the prospects of creating an FDA-like agency for every product area and expecting those
agencies to stay abreast of changing technology boggles one's mind.
Of course, under the author's scheme, courts would play an important back-up role in reviewing the adequacy of warnings for
products that have not been the subject of federal regulation. But I
am already on the written record to the effect that the common law

governing liability for inadequate product warnings is on the edge
of total collapse. 65 Would a federal statute, aimed at stiffening the
courts' resolve to do a better job in reviewing warnings, solve the
59

See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 212.
It at 213: "If we wish to create appropriate incentives, the products liability
system must rely on ... deterrence values for life and injury.... Saying that an individual's life is worth $3 million or $5 million may be surprising, [but is necessary to induce
firms to invest adequately in safety.]"
61
ViscUsI, supra note 2, at 85.
62 The organic approach to change that the author advocates could be achieved
only by uniform regulations at the national level.
63
Much more modest federal reforms have yet to win passage in the Congress, and
prospects
appear dim.
future
64 See supra text accompanying note 49.
65 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 31.
60
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problem? I would set the probability of that occurring, even in the
distant future, at near zero. Bearing in mind that the federal statute
would be aimed largely at state and not federal judges, judicial cooperation with essentially hortatory commands from on high would
be conspicuous by its absence. 6 6 Not surprisingly, measures aimed
at reforming state failure-to-warn rules have been excluded from
federal products reform proposals in recent years. Indeed, even at
the state level, legislative efforts to reform warnings jurisprudence
have largely been abandoned, given the ftitility of state legislatures
begging their own judges to take failure-to-warn litigation more
67
seriously.
Now for the last question: What are the implications of gradual, or only partial, implementation of the author's reform proposals? To understand the importance of this question, and to begin to
discover its answer, one must re-examine an aspect of the author's
project significant enough to have gotten into the title of this review
essay: the author's package for reform is, in contrast to most others,
emphatically organic in nature. The author has offered an integrated, internally consistent package of reforms, each part of which
is both justified by reference to an underlying norm-allocative efficiency-and interrelated with the other parts. Moreover, the reform
package recognizes the differences in institutional competence between and among the various social institutions that may regulate
product safety, and allocates to each those tasks for which each is
best suited. Thus, the author's reform package is "organic" in the
true meaning of the term. 68 It is not radical in the sense that social
insurance or no-fault compensation would replace tort. 69 If the author's proposals for change were to be implemented wholesale, one
would be left with a products liability system. However, it would be
a system whose parts very much depended on each other for their
efficacy.
At this point it might be helpful to pause and observe that all
legal systems are to some extent organic, as I have defined the term.
Certainly the common law is organic, as are reforms that have codified, 70 or replaced altogether, the common law. 7 ' When one con66 I assume that, as traditionally the case, state courts are the primary implementors
of tort law.
67 As of July, 1989, 33 jurisdictions had enacted products liability reform legislation. Of these, only eight statutes explicitly addressed the question of liability for failure
to warn.
68 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69 The author counsels against a worker compensation no-fault approach. See Vis-

cusi, supra note 2, at 180.
70 See, e.g., the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).

71

See, e.g., a typical worker compensation act.
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siders proposals to change the common law, or to supplement it,
relatively nonorganic approaches are available. For example, the
author suggests that courts should hold a tighter rein on failure-towarn claims 72 and that courts should require plaintiffs in product
design litigation to show feasible alternatives; 73 both suggestions
are marginal adjustments to the common law existing in some states
that could stand alone. 74 But Figure 2 indicates the emphatic interdependence of his suggestions that compensatory damages be increased dramatically while liability is reduced, that statutory
compliance be a complete bar, and that regulation largely replace
the market in deciding which categories of products should be
marketed.
In contrast to the author's organic approach, most other reform
proposals advanced in recent years take What the author describes,
somewhat derogatorily, as a "grab bag" 75 or "Chinese menu" 76 approach. From a long list of possible reforms, one chooses a smaller
number for inclusion in a reform package on the basis of considerations that purport to include policy justifications, likely impacts on
producers' exposures to liability, and political appeal. Each element
of such a reform package stands independently; passage of any one
or any combination would represent some improvement from the
standpoint of traditional reform proponents. 77 In one sense, the author is correct in criticizing the haphazardness of such incremental
approaches to products liability reform. Even if each item in an incremental reform package can be defended on policy grounds, the
comparative lack of self-conscious organic integration betrays a certain ."any stick to beat a dog" quality. To this point, the organic
nature of the author's reform package appears a definite plus. Indeed, nonorganic approaches appear inelegant, to the point of being scruffy. The emphatically organic approach to reform, on the
other hand, appears more principled, more dignified.
But now consider the implication of gradual, or partial, implementation of each type of tort reform. Scruffy, nonorganic reform
confronts few problems in this regard. If sponsors of such a propoSee supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
74 That is, both of these suggestions relate directly to existing law and practice, and
both would work improvements if adopted by themselves. Indeed, in some jurisdictions
the author's suggestions approximate existing law.
75 Viscusi, supra note 2, at 4.
76 Id. at 211.
77 The author asserts, and I tend to agree, that most reform proposals are sponsored by business interests and are aimed at reducing producers' exposures to liability.
Id. at 4. If one views current exposures as excessive, of course, cutting back is a reasonable and rational objective. But the point here is that the cost-reduction objective can
be achieved by nonorganic changes in the law.
72

73

610

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:596

sal approach a legislature with a ten-point reform package and only
six or seven are enacted, they can treat the result as no small victory.
"Half a loaf," as they say. What are the parallel implications for
organic reform? They might be nothing short of disastrous. Because each of the parts depends for its efficacy on the others, anything short of a complete, or very nearly complete, implementation
is worse than no implementation at all.
Consider the implications of adopting one aspect of the author's plan without the other, and focusing on the organic interdependency between liability and damages introduced by the author's
proposals for change: significantly increase compensatory damages
but leave the liability issues much as they are, or leave compensatory
damages as they are and cut back substantially on liability. Since the
two reforms are meant to complement one another, adoption of
only one would make things worse, not better. 7 I am certain the
author would agree with these observations, and then would remind
us that Congress would enact all of these changes in one complete
package. But would change occur quickly? To the contrary, change
would more likely come slowly, haltingly and, to some extent, not at
all. During the long, perhaps interminable period of transition,
things would be worse than before, judged by most criteria, including the author's.
Thus I return to the question with which this critique began.
Do the author's proposals make sense? As a theoretical matter, I
believe most of them do. In theory, assuming that efficiency is an
appropriate goal for products liability, the author's assignments of
responsibility for safety among courts, legislatures, agencies, producers and consumers would constitute improvements over existing
law. As I noted earlier, I would favor leaving questions of "Which
broad product categories deserved to be produced and distributed?" to the market rather than to government regulators; but reasonable minds may differ on this issue.
As a practical matter, however, I would not recommend acting
on his proposals. Organic tort reform only works if taken as a
whole, which is very unlikely to occur even if Congress could somehow be convinced to try. Taking such reform by halves invites disaster. Having said this, I may appear to contradict myself when I
conclude that two elements of his plan could, and I believe should,
be implemented independently of the others. I agree with the author that courts should run a tighter ship in connection with failure78
Clearly the author intends them to balance one another. "My proposals pertaining to liability standards will reduce the costs imposed by products liability. In contrast,
my proposals for scheduling damages... will boost the cost imposed by liability." Id. at
12.
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to-warn claims and should require plaintiffs complaining of risky
product designs to prove the availability to defendant of a feasible,
cost-effective alternative at the time of distribution. He probably
envisions more drastic cutbacks in liability than I do, but we are in
substantial agreement. These suggestions are not new with the author, 79 but he gets credit for recognizing their inherent good sense.
These suggestions for change are acceptable because they are not,
as are the other major elements of his proposal, tied organically to
the other changes he espouses.8 0 In contrast, the uniquely organic
aspects of his reform package-that Congress and new FDA-like
regulatory agencies should become more active regarding product
safety and that compensatory damages for death and injury to
health should be increased substantially-are fraught with the potential for making our admittedly imperfect products liability system
even worse.
At this point I may appear to be taking the side of piecemeal,
eclectic, grab-bag, politically-oriented, scruffy tort reform. On balance, I suppose I am. Integrated, emphatically organic approaches
to tort reform have a "good side-bad side" quality to them. On the
good side, they are principled, internally consistent, often elegant.
On the bad side, they have an all-or-nothing quality and their logic
tends to have a grinding relentlessness that answers every issue but
does so uncompromisingly. This is true to some extent even with
respect to proposals that codify or replace the common law altogether;8 ' but it is inescapably true of organic proposals to reform
tort law. Thus, it is not surprising that Professor Viscusi is an economist, since economics, after all, is a quintessentially integrated, organic approach to problem-solving. To the extent that other
integrated approaches to social problems might generate their own
tort reform packages, 8 2 I suspect they would make me nervous for
the same basic reasons this author's proposals do. While I reject the
author's reform package, I respect him for having written an interesting book, full of provocative insights. Those involved with products liability and the reform thereof should read it and reach their
own conclusions.

See supra notes 31, 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
82
For example, one might accept accident victim compensation and loss-spreading
as one's goal, proposing changes that would expand liability dramatically but cut back
significantly on damages.
79
80

